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ABSTRACT 
The development of new intelligent agents requires an interdisciplinary approach to pro­
gramming. The initial challenge is to describe the desired agent behaviors and abilities without 
necessarily committing the agent development project to one particular programming language. 
What are the appropriate linguistic and logical tools for creating a top level, unambiguous, 
program-independent, and consistent description of the functions and behaviors of the agent? 
And how can that description then be translated easily into one of a number of program lan­
guages? This article provides a case study of the application of a simple Belief, Desire, and 
Intention (EDI) first order logic to a complex set of agent functions of a theoretical community 
of intelligent nano-spacecraft. The basic research was conducted at NASA-GSFC (Greenbelt), 
Advanced Architecture Branch, during the summer of 2001. The simple examples of applied 
BDI logic presented here suggest broad application in agent software development. 
INTRODUCTION 
The demand for intelligent agent software is likely to grow as both public and private sector 
innovators seek to deploy adaptive, autonomous, information technologies to production, sched­
uling, resource management, office assistance, information collection, remote sensing, and other 
complex functions. Intelligent agents, also knows as autonomous agents, are distinguished from 
other software programs by their ability to respond to a changing environment in pursuit of goals. 
One of the most critical stages of such intelligent agent development is the basic research 
that goes into determining how to translate client needs into agent software. Since programmers 
and operations managers have different expertise, there is often a linguistic gap between the 
functional language of the customer and the technical programming language of the agent devel­
oper. If the customer and agent developer do not speak a common language, both time and money 
may be lost in needless errors and misunderstandings. 
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There is a need for a program-independent, unambiguous, logically consistent language for 
describing the desired computer agent practical reasoning abilities and behaviors. Program inde­
pendence gives the customer maximum flexibility in choosing a programming language to imple­
ment the desired functions. The avoidance of ambiguity allows the customer to say exactly what 
she means. And logical consistency ensures that only valid arguments will be generated by the 
agent's knowledge base, avoiding false beliefs about the world from being deduced from true 
beliefs. 
A program independent language for describing agent functions, practical reasoning, and 
behaviors, solves what may be called the top-level description problem. The top level of descrip­
tion should be close enough to ordinary English to be interdisciplinary, yet rigorous enough to 
avoid ambiguity and inconsistency. The strategy of solving this problem borrows from first order 
logic, cognitive science and recent work in the field of artificial intelligence, specifically autono­
mous agent theory (see, e.g., the collection of articles in Muller, Wooldridge, & Jennings, 1997). 
The solution to the top level description problem suggested by some of the recent autono­
mous agent research is to combine the practical reasoning tools developed by psychologist Michael 
Bratman's belief, desire, and intention (BDI) framework (1987), with some of the tools of first 
order logic. This hybrid language is usually referred to as BDI logic. There are a number of BDI 
logics under development; here we employ the Logic of Rational Agents (LORA) developed by 
Michael Wooldridge (2000) to illustrate how BDI logic works in practice. 
The authors faced the top-level description problem at NASA during the basic research 
stage of specifying the behaviors of a community of agents, in this case, the Autonomous Nano-
Technology Swarm (ANTS).' ANTS will be designed to engage in practical reasoning and behav­
iors that implement the variety of functions necessary to explore the asteroid belt and communi­
cate observations to earth. 
' The ANTS concept is indebted to the work of Mark Campbell, et al. (05/31/99) in "Intelligent Satellite Teams for Space 
Systems." As an example of an Intelligent Satellite Team (1ST), the report considered "a large number of satellites orbiting the Sun using 
optical and infrared sensors to look for asteroids" (p. 7). These satellites would share data, track, and collect information about interest­
ing asteroids. The report mentions the important role of practical reasoning in 1ST: "Reasoning in an agent allows the agent to reach an 
intelligent conclusion or decision about a given set of data" (p. 31). The report notes that this practical reasoning would give the agent 
more adaptability and autonomy. But there is no attempt to develop a top-level language for describing this type of reasoning. 
In another foundational paper. Steven Curtis, et al. (2(XX)) provides a description of the mission, system architectures, and ANT 
functions, including the type of instruments ANTS will employ to collect data bout asteroids. There are also descriptions of how ANTS 
might coordinate their functions. The operational scenarios, however, do not attempt to represent the state of knowledge of each ANT. 
and therefore do not reveal the anatomy of practical reasoning. Again, a language of ANT practical reasoning would be required to carry 
out such an objective. 
Turszkowski, Zoch, and Smith (2000) point out that a subsystem agent must be able to exercise some "reasoning process" in 
order to make use of external resources in new ways (p. 6). The first stage in realizing spacecraft constellation autonomy is "agent 
development." We suggest that tfiis stage requires an economic way to describe practical reasoning of the agents. 
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METHODOLOGY 
The first methodological consideration is to deujrmine the level of detail that is appropriate 
in applying LORA as an agent development tool. The purpose of using BDI logic here is not to 
prove theorems; a sufficient body of deductive proofs has already been developed in first order 
logic textbooks. Nor is it to impress the client with obtuse descriptions of functions. It is rather to 
use just enough symbolism to economize the clarify the practical reasoning of the agents. 
The second methodological consideration is to announce our position on exactly what we 
mean to imply when employing psychological terms to describe computer agents. In what John 
Searle calls strong AI, conscious experience is attributed to intelligent computer agents (1984). 
In this paper we remain agnostic with regard to the debate over whether computer agents have 
real as opposed to "as if intentionality (see Mills, 1998a; 1998b, for a detailed discussion). We 
discuss only those features of the debate that elucidate the advantages of using BDI logic as 
opposed to engineering or design idioms for top-leve l descriptions of communities of agents. 
Part one of this paper provides theoretical justitication for the use of Bratman's BDI frame­
work for understanding agent behaviors. Part two provides an explanation of how first order 
logic can be combined with BDI and a dynamic component to account for agent decisions in time. 
Part three presents a practical problem of describing the behavior of a community of agents 
involved in a very complex scientific endeavor, in this case, the ANTS exploration of the asteroid 
belt. We believe the insights presented here have practical implications for the large variety of 
agents that will be developed in the near future. 
PART I. BRATMAN'S BDI FRAMEWORK: THE INTENTIONAL STANCE 
The intentional stance treats a sufficiently complex system as if it had mental states and 
engaged in practical reasoning. The term "intentionality," first used in empirical psychology by 
Franz Brentano (1973/1874), means directness towards an object. As John Searle points out 
(1984), one of the unique features of mental states is that they are always directed towards or 
about some object. If I perceive, I perceive something. If I believe, I believe that something is the 
case. If I intend something, I have some purpose in mind. We often use the intentional stance 
towards artifacts also, as when we say the car does not want to start. But we do not really believe 
that a car has desires; we speak only of the car "as if it had desires to avoid a mechanical 
description of what is going on when it fails to start. 
Regardless of where one stands in the philosophical debate regarding whether more com­
plex machines such as computer agents have real or just "as if intentionality, both sides gener­
ally agree that the intentional stance is an economic way to describe a complex system that 
engages in practical reasoning. Daniel Dennett (1978) points out that this economy of expression 
becomes clear when we contrast the intentional stEince with the engineering stance. ANTS pro­
vides a good example of the economy of expression that results from opuug for the intentional 
stance for top-level descriptions of agent behaviors. 
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Imagine a community of nano-spacecraft setting out to explore the asteroid belt. At some 
point in the deployment of this community, ANT #24 determines some activity is a priority and 
desires to execute that activity. At the programming level of description one would need to know 
the semantics and syntax of the programming language and read the code. At the even more 
detailed engineering level, one would then translate this higher level code into the impossibly 
complex machine code. 
By contrast, if one employs the intentional stance, the practical reasoning of Agent #24 
becomes simple and concise; "Agent #24 desires to observe Asteroid Psyche, believes that the 
conditions are now optimal for such observation, and thus intends to make such observations." 
The next step is to imbed this intentional language in a first order logic to ensure the consistency 
of all descriptions of the ANTS behaviors. 
PART II. COMBINING DBI WITH FIRST ORDER LOGIC AND DYNAMICS 
First Order Loeic 
First order logic contains simple symbolic rules for combining propositions. For example, 
"Anna is a student and Anna is a biology major" can be represented by conjunction: p q. First 
order logic provides a generally accepted consistent logic. It is ideal for stating combinations and 
relations between beliefs, desires, and intentions about the world. It allows us to state just what 
the system knows without having to account for what it does not yet know (see Levesque & 
Lakemeyer, 2000, for a discussion). 
In order to represent the knowledge of the agent, some initial set of beliefs about the world 
are formulated. The inference of rules of first order logic are used to ensure that the beliefs are 
consistent and that arguments are always valid. By following the basic rules of first order logic, 
new beliefs can be deduced from the current set of beliefs and acquired beliefs. (These acquired 
beliefs are based, e.g., on new inputs from the environment.) 
In the case of ANTS, the initial beliefs are about known asteroid types, relative locations, 
shapes, rotations, mass, distribution, gravity, albedo and in some cases provisional classifica­
tions of asteroids (P. E. Clark, ANTS 04/05/01). The inputs will originate in sensor instrument 
data and communications data. 
Example in ANTS Knowledee Base 
An example of a representation in the ANTS knowledge base using some simplified LORA 
is: 
• (differentiated Psyche v (undiff) Psyche [either,or] 
• (differentiated Psyche => (PriorityObject) Psyche [if, then] 
• (differentiated)Psyche {new knowledge!} 
• (5000MIFRAnt#24) Psyche 
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Notice that first order logic is used here, without BDI, to represent the truism that asteroid 
Psyche is either differentiated or undifferentiated. If it is differentiated, it becomes a priority 
object of investigation that could trigger other actions. Assume that sensor information confirms 
that Psyche is differentiated. It then follows necessiuily that Psyche becomes a priority object. 
The last formula states that ANT #24 is in the proximity of Psyche. We can expect that, given the 
right combination of BDI, #24 will set as a goal the closer observation of Psyche and finally 
actuate behaviors towards the attainment of the goal. 
In order to begin the construction of a language that includes practical reasoning, Wooldridge 
adds a Belief component to represent epistemic states (2000). Thus we refine our description of 
ANT #24's knowledge by adding: 
(Bel q PriorityObject(Psyche)) 
Here, agent #24 (represented by the symbol "q") believes that psyche is a priority object. 
This belief can be updated or modified given additional information from the sensors or new 
communications. 
In order to complete Bratman's framework for practical reasoning, we now add the inten­
tional and emotive components: intentions and desires. Consider a desire as an enduring goal. An 
agent may have a number of desires, only some of which are realizable at any given time. An 
intention is a pro-attitude. That is, it is a movement toward an immediate objective until that 
objective is fulfilled or some new event changes the current intention (Wooldridge, 2000). This 
distinction between intentions and desires helps us to explain how an agent may change course in 
response to environmental variables that change through time. Here is an example of epistemic 
and emotive states combined, using LORA: 
• (Des ruler (Bel worker#24 PriorityObject (Psyche))) 
Here the ruler agent desires that ANT #24 believes that psyche is a priority object. This 
mental state is important because it may trigger an action by ANT#24, which has among its 
desires a desire to pursue priorities set by the ruler ANT. 
Dynamic (Temporal) Component 
Now that first order logic and BDI have been combined there is one more critical step 
required to complete a top-level description of autonomous agency: dynamics. In order to repre­
sent practical reasoning and resulting behaviors through time, a schema of relevant features of 
the present state of affairs is constructed. Since not every feature of the universe can be repre­
sented, the state of affairs, that is, the world of the agent, contains beliefs about only those 
features of the universe relevant to the functions of the agent. Since some agent technologies will 
be able to learn from their experience, in some architecture the relevant states of affairs can 
expand and change. For the present purpose humans will define the relevant state of affairs. Each 
node in the schema will branch out into possible worlds. These possible worlds are alternative 
paths that the agent may select, depending on its current beliefs, desires, and intentions. The 
following map illustrates a world time schema: 
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THE WORLD OF ANT 
Each world/time state has a number of 
possible futures, a = transition actions 
w,t = world,time; p,q,r,s,t are beliefs; a = transition action; branches represent possible worlds 
(see Wooldridge, 2000 for a more detailed description of agent behaviors through time; the above 
chart is adapted from pp. 56, 64, 94) 
Specification of Functions 
We are not ready to specify the functions of various agents in the community of agents and 
then apply LORA to describe their behaviors. 
i*- General ANT community functions 
• mapping and close-up imaging of Asteroids using multi-spectral band coverage 
[Clark, Memo 04/05/01] 
Worker ANT functions 
• Communications, resource management, navigation, local status (housekeeping), local 
conflict resolutions, science data acquisition processing [Curtis et al., 2000, 3] 
Ruler ANT functions 
• Plan assignments for worker ANTS 
• Maintain shared SWARM statistics 
• Resource management [see S. Curtis, et al., 2000, 3] 
The ANTS is conceptualized here as a community of autonomous rational agents whose 
behaviors are generated by a knowledge base (KB), a set of goals, inference procedures, and 
percepts. Although each worker ANT is autonomous in terms of its own function, it is subordi­
nate to the function of the ruler. The intentions of the ruler are passed on to the workers through 
the messengers and the workers actuate the plans that achieve the goal. 
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Each worker has as its permanent goal the appropriate and timely collection or discovery of 
data from the target type of objects, the maintenance of health and safety, and the timely commu­
nication of data to the messengers, who in turn report to the ruler and to earth. The workers' goals 
are sub-goals of the ruler's goal and the worker's plan at any given state of affairs is a sub-plan of 
the ruler's plan. 
Example of a LORA Specification 
In the scenario, the Ruler has received information about an opportunity to view Psyche 
under ideal conditions and there is a group of worker ,ants in the neighborhood of Asteroid Psyche 
(A). 
The Ruler forms an intention to attain a goal as a result of a deduction that employs beliefs 
in its KB, acquired beliefs derived from current percepts, and its belief derived from communica­
tions with all ANTS. There is a potential for a group of workers and allied messengers to achieve 
the goal. This is exactly the sort of scenario supported by BDI type logic! 
For simplicity temporal considerations, quantification, proofs, and goal/sub-goal relations 
are left out. We seek to illustrate here the usefulness of BDI logic to model the practical reasoning 
or "mental states" of cooperating agents. 
A = constant for Psyche 
PfC = perception of the potential for cooperation 
i = ruler agent 
j = messenger agent 
g = group of worker agents, each with specialized observation instruments 
a = action 
(p = goal to study Asteroid Psyche 
achvs = attain through an action 
Bel = Belief 
Des = Desire 
n = Set of plans to be actuated (executed) by each vi'orker to attain cp 
tp = Preconditions for cp to become the next goal (Science agenda from humans, combination of 
percepts in relation to KB) 
J-attempt = joint attempt 
Assumption: The Ruler has formed an intention to achieve the goal of collecting data about 
Asteroid Psyche. We do not here represent the deliberations that lead to this intention. We begin 
with the process of mobilizing the workers to achieve the goal and a description of the mental 
state of the community of agents. 
The Ruler forms an intention to attain a goal (to study Psyche) as a result of (p having been 
met. (p, in this case, is a combination of the ruler's KB, mission priorities, current percepts, its 
belief that the goal has not yet been attained, its belief that the ruler itself cannot or does not desire 
to achieve the goal by itself, and its belief that there is a potential for a group of workers and 
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allied messengers to achieve the goal. The ruler will therefore intend not only the goal, but that the 
messenger intends the goal and that the group of workers intends the goal and finally achieves the 
goal. 
Additional Specifications 
(Int i (p) (PfCi (p) ^ (Int i (Int j (p (Int g (p))) 
The ruler intends the goal of studying the Asteroid Psyche and acknowledges the potential for 
cooperation among the workers to being about the goal and intends that the messenger intends 
that the group of workers intends the goal. 
Int i (Achvs g a 7t tp) 
The ruler intends that each member of the group following its share of the plan can achieve the 
goal through the group's actions. 
{Inform i j a Tt cp} (Request Thi i a (Inform j g a 7t cp}} 
Agree j i a'}; a' 
Here the a is the informing action and a' is the action that j agrees to perform. 
(Inform j g a Jt cp} ^ (Requests Thj g a (Happens a')} 
It is assumed that, unless the workers receive percepts, in relation to their KB, that requires that 
the goal be reevaluated, the group will believe that it can execute the plan to achieve the goal. 
(M-Bel g -1 cp) (M-Des(Achvs a 7t cp)) ^ (M-Int g (Achvs a; cp?)) = (j-Attempt g a cp) 
The advantage of using a language like LORA is that we can always add new functions to 
an agent and make agent behaviors depend on previous knowledge (the set of beliefs in KB and 
new percepts). We can also add to a list of possible behaviors by adding new beliefs. Most 
important, we can very economically describe the behavior of the system at a "high level without 
employing a program language. 
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